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* The Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno, United States 
District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting 









SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
Victor Mondelli sued Berkeley Heights Nursing and 
Rehabilitation Center (“Berkeley Heights”) and several of its 
employees for violating the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”) and for intentionally inflicting emotional distress.1  
Mondelli failed to cooperate with his counsel to provide 
discovery, so the District Court dismissed his complaint for 
failure to prosecute.  Because there was verifiable evidence 
that placed Mondelli’s competency at issue, the Court 
prematurely dismissed his case.  We will therefore vacate the 
dismissal order and remand for the Court to examine his 
competency, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 




Mondelli has a long history of mental health issues, 
including suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and major 
depression.  Despite these conditions, he attempted to attend to 
 
1 The individual Defendants are: (1) Marina Ferrer, 
Administrator of Berkeley Heights; (2) Diane Wilverding, the 
Director of Recreation; (3) Mary Chmura, a former employee; 
(4) Leanne Fiet, a consultant and compliance advisor; (5) 
Pamela McCarthy, an employee; (6) Virginia Doe, an 
employee; and (7) John/Jane Does one through five, other 




the needs of his mother while she resided at Berkeley Heights.  
During his daily twelve-hour visits, Mondelli allegedly 
observed the staff provide his mother with inadequate care.  
Mondelli regularly complained to Berkeley Heights staff, the 
New Jersey Board of Health, and the Office of the Ombudsman 
for the Institutionalized Elderly.  After several contentious 
visits, including ones when both sides called the police, 
Mondelli’s visits were limited to one to two hours per day in 
the lobby.   Mondelli’s mother passed away in 2015.   
 
Mondelli thereafter filed a complaint alleging violations 
of Title II of the ADA and for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.  After Defendants filed their answer, the 
Magistrate Judge set a schedule for Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26 disclosures, service of interrogatories, and 
completion of discovery.  Defendants thereafter sent Mondelli 
interrogatories and requests for admission.  Mondelli did not 
produce his Rule 26 disclosures or discovery responses.  The 
Magistrate Judge then provided Mondelli with several deadline 
extensions, all of which he missed.   
 
In response to Defendants’ request to file dispositive 
motions based upon Mondelli’s noncompliance, the Magistrate 
Judge issued an order directing Mondelli to show cause why 
he should not be sanctioned for his failure to produce 
discovery.   Mondelli responded with a certification, in which 
he explained, among other things, that he (1) suffers from a 
variety of physical and mental health conditions; (2) was found 
incompetent to stand trial in the Municipal Court of Fanwood, 
New Jersey; and (3) has been unable to properly communicate 
with his lawyer.  Mondelli also presented several exhibits, 
including letters from physicians and a psychiatrist stating he 




him stress and anxiety that has made it difficult for him to 
attend school, work, and court proceedings.  Based upon the 
certification and accompanying exhibits, Mondelli asked the 
Magistrate Judge to place his case on administrative hold.   
 
The Magistrate Judge granted his request, and the case 
was administratively terminated for 180 days, after which the 
case would be dismissed with prejudice if Mondelli did not 
seek to reopen the case.  Mondelli thereafter moved to reopen 
or extend the time to do so.  In his supporting certification, 
Mondelli again discussed his poor physical and mental health.  
Defendants opposed the motion, arguing that the six factors 
from Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 
(3d Cir. 1984),2 required dismissal for failure to prosecute.   
 
 The District Court thereafter denied Mondelli’s motion 
to reopen and, weighing the Poulis factors, dismissed his 
complaint with prejudice.  Specifically, the Court: (1) found 
that Mondelli was personally responsible for his failure to 
prosecute; (2) concluded that Defendants were prejudiced by 
his failure to prosecute; (3) observed that Mondelli had a 
history of dilatoriness; (4) refused to find that Mondelli or his 
counsel were acting willfully or in bad faith; (5) determined 
 
2 These factors are: “(1) the extent of the party’s 
personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary 
caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to 
discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct 
of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the 
effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails 
an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness 





that no sanction other than dismissal would be effective or 
appropriate; and (6) held that Mondelli’s ADA claim lacked 
merit but declined to opine that his intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claim was meritless.   In reaching these 
conclusions, the Court acknowledged Mondelli’s counsel’s 
assertions concerning a municipal judge’s finding that 
Mondelli was incompetent and counsel’s statements that 
Mondelli was not fit to represent himself, but the Court stated 
that there was no documentary support for these assertions.   
 
Mondelli appealed and we appointed amicus counsel to 
address:  (1) “whether the District Court erred in dismissing 
Mondelli’s action for failure to prosecute without first 
inquiring into Mondelli’s competency”; and (2) “whether the 
District Court properly considered and balanced the [Poulis] 
factors . . . before dismissing Mondelli’s complaint.”  Order, 




The Court has a duty to ensure that incompetent persons 
are properly represented.  To this end, we must determine 
whether Rule 17 requires a district court to inquire into a 
plaintiff’s competency before dismissing his complaint for 
failure to prosecute.  Rule 17 provides that “an incompetent 
person who does not have a duly appointed representative may 
sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem.  The court must 
 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  When 
a district court dismisses a case for a failure to prosecute under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), we review for abuse of 




appoint a guardian ad litem—or issue another appropriate 
order—to protect [an] incompetent person who is 
unrepresented in an action.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(2).  Rule 17 
sets forth examples of representatives who may sue or defend 
on behalf of an incompetent person, such as a general guardian, 
a committee, a conservator, or a like fiduciary.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
17(c)(1). 
 
A court’s obligation under Rule 17 to appoint a guardian 
for an incompetent person is mandatory.  Powell v. Symons, 
680 F.3d 301, 303 (3d Cir. 2012).  A district court must invoke 
Rule 17 sua sponte and consider whether to appoint a 
representative for an incompetent person when there is 
“verifiable evidence of incompetence.”4  Id. at 307.  Verifiable 
evidence of incompetence includes (1) “evidence from an 
appropriate court of record or a relevant public agency 
indicating that the party had been adjudicated incompetent,” or 
(2) “evidence from a mental health professional demonstrating 
that the party is being or has been treated for mental illness of 
the type that would render him or her legally incompetent.”  Id. 
(quoting Ferrelli v. River Manor Health Care Ctr., 323 F.3d 
196, 201 (2d Cir. 2003)).  Therefore, anecdotal information or 
layperson opinions do not constitute verifiable evidence. 
 
4 “[B]izarre behavior alone, even if such behavior may 
suggest mental incapacity[,]” does not trigger a Rule 17 inquiry 
because “[t]he federal courts are flooded with pro se litigants 
with fanciful notions of their rights and deprivations.”  Powell, 
680 F.3d at 307; see also Ferrelli v. River Manor Health Care 
Ctr., 323 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that Rule 17 is 
not triggered “simply because the litigant asserts her own 





Here, there was verifiable evidence of Mondelli’s 
potential incompetence to trigger a Rule 17 inquiry.  When 
Mondelli’s counsel appeared before the Magistrate Judge, he 
presented letters from several doctors, including a psychiatrist, 
who opined that Mondelli suffers from “a major psychiatric 
condition,” J.A. 91; is “unable to attend court” as a result, J.A. 
92; has been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia that 
causes “psychotic symptoms,” J.A. 94-98; has been diagnosed 
with major depression; and is “totally and permanently 
disabled due to his illness,” J.A. 98.  These letters from “mental 
health professional[s],” notifying the Court that Mondelli “is 
being or has been treated for mental illness of the type that 
would render him . . . legally incompetent,” were sufficient to 
trigger a sua sponte inquiry under Rule 17.  Powell, 680 F.3d 
at 307 (quoting Ferrelli, 323 F.3d at 201); see also Allen v. 
Calderon, 408 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
letters from the pro se plaintiff, his friend, and his prison 
psychiatrist, which noted that the plaintiff suffers from chronic 
undifferentiated schizophrenia, were “sufficient evidence of 
incompetence at least to require the district court to make a 
competency determination” under Rule 17).  Based on this 
verifiable evidence of Mondelli’s potential incompetence, a 
Rule 17 inquiry was required.5 
 
5 Although the evidence was presented during 
proceedings before the Magistrate Judge and not to the District 
Court Judge, the evidence was placed on the docket and hence 
is part of the District Court’s record.  In addition, Mondelli’s 
counsel informed the District Court that Mondelli’s May 19 
Certification in response to the order to show cause “include[d] 




Contrary to Defendants’ arguments, Rule 17’s 
obligation is not limited to pro se litigants.6  Rule 17(c)(2) 
states in relevant part: “The court must appoint a guardian ad 
litem—or issue another appropriate order—to protect a minor 
or incompetent person who is unrepresented in an action.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P.17(c)(2).  When read in the context of Rule 
17(c)(1), which provides examples of acceptable 
“representatives,” it becomes clear that the phrase 
“unrepresented in an action” under Rule 17 does not refer to 
whether the party has counsel.  Rather, whether an incompetent 
person is “unrepresented in an action” refers to whether that 
person has a Rule 17-type representative.  As the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit has stated, Rule 17(c) mandates 
“that when an ‘incompetent person’ is not represented by a full-
time guardian, the court ‘shall appoint a guardian ad litem for 
[that person] . . . or shall make such other order as it deems 
proper’ to protect the incompetent’s interests.”  Ferrelli, 323 
F.3d at 201 (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 
17(c)(2)).  The Ferrelli court focused on whether the person 
was “represented by a full-time guardian,” and not whether the 
person was represented by counsel.  See id. 
 
Our Court has also considered a court’s Rule 17 
obligation where the person has counsel.  In Gardner ex rel. 
Gardner v. Parson, the grandmother of a mentally impaired 
teenager initiated an action on behalf of herself and as next 
friend to her granddaughter.  874 F.2d 131, 134-36 (3d Cir. 
1989).  For reasons not relevant here, we agreed with the 
district court that neither the granddaughter’s court-appointed 
special advocate nor her grandmother could serve as her next 
 
6 The plaintiffs in Powell, 680 F.3d at 303, and Ferrelli, 




friend.  Id. at 137-39.  This ruling left the incompetent 
granddaughter unrepresented for Rule 17 purposes.  Even 
though she had counsel, we held that the district court should 
have nonetheless appointed a new next friend to represent her 
interests.  Id. at 140 n.14.  We so ruled because a person’s legal 
interest in a case may be different from what is in the person’s 
overall best interest.  Moreover, one who lacks capacity to 
make decisions for himself needs someone to do so for him.  
For these reasons, while 
 
[i]t may be possible for the court to appoint 
counsel as a representative for a minor [or 
incompetent person,] . . . the appointment of 
counsel as a representative is not always prudent.  
[In fact,] [o]ne commentator has noted that this 
is generally inadvisable, because a lawyer who 
acts in both capacities may sometimes fail to 
distinguish between the two roles.[7] 
 
7 Mondelli’s counsel recognized that a lawyer and a 
representative serve different roles, and that it may not be 
advisable for a lawyer to play both roles simultaneously.  To 
this end, Mondelli’s counsel asked the District Court to appoint 
a power of attorney to make decisions for Mondelli in this case.  
Counsel explained that he was uncomfortable producing Rule 
26 disclosures without approval from either Mondelli or an 
appointed representative.  The Court acknowledged the 
“untenable position” that counsel faced in his attempt to 
balance his obligations to both his client and to the Court.  J.A. 
14.  Other district courts have made similar observations.  See 
Bacon v. Mandell, No. 10-cv-5506, 2012 WL 4105088, at *14 
(D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2012) (“[A] Rule 17(c) appointment of a 








Id.  Thus, even though a person may have legal counsel, that 
person’s other interests may remain unrepresented and 
“otherwise unprotected.”  Id. at 141.  Until a court satisfies 
itself that those interests are protected, it lacks the authority to 
reach the merits of the case.  Id.  In sum, a district court 
presented with verifiable evidence of incompetence may abuse 
its discretion under Rule 17(c) if it fails to appoint a next friend 
or guardian ad litem to represent an incompetent person, even 
when he or she is represented by counsel.8 
 
scenario where such representative, being obligated to 
effectively wear ‘two hats’ by acting as both a guardian ad 
litem and pro bono counsel, might find himself/herself caught 
in a limbo, being [] unable to continue wearing both these 
hats[.]”); see also Wright v. Wenerowicz, No. 2:14-cv-00245, 
2018 WL 1081982, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2018) (finding  
“appointing a guardian ad litem to represent [the plaintiff’s] 
interests in conjunction with [his attorney]  to be a more 
suitable course of action than simply appointing a new 
attorney”). 
8 Sometimes, however, the appointment of counsel may 
be sufficient.  See Powell, 680 F.3d at 308-09 (“Therefore, we 
will reverse and remand with directions to the District Court to 
appoint a representative or counsel to proceed with the case.”).  
If a district court concludes that counsel can sufficiently protect 
the interests of his incompetent client under Rule 17, then the 
court should make such a finding.  See Krain v. Smallwood, 
880 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that a district court 




Because Mondelli presented verifiable evidence 
concerning his potential incompetency, the District Court 
should have conducted an inquiry into his competency 
regardless of whether he had legal counsel.  Relatedly, because 
Mondelli’s competence may impact the findings concerning 
his personal responsibility for disregarding his discovery 
obligations and whether he did so willfully or in bad faith,9 the 
Court prematurely determined that the Poulis factors supported 
dismissal.10  
 
the incompetent person’s interests would be adequately 
protected by the appointment of a lawyer”).  Such a counsel, 
however, must be capable of representing all of the person’s 
interests, not just his legal interests in the particular case.  
Because the District Court did not conduct a Rule 17 inquiry, 
it made no finding as to either whether counsel could protect 
all of Mondelli’s interests or about the scope of counsel’s 
authority. 
9 For example, while Mondelli is literally responsible 
for the delay (i.e., he caused the delay) and has a history of 
dilatoriness, his diagnosis may preclude the Court from 
holding that he is legally culpable for the delay.  Similarly, if 
he is deemed incompetent, then it may be inappropriate to 
construe his actions as willful or in bad faith.  On the other 
hand, as Amicus agrees, if Mondelli is deemed to be 
competent, then the Poulis factors “would likely weigh 
against” him.  Amicus Reply Br. at 11 n.3.   
10 Although there may be reason to doubt the merits of 
Mondelli’s claims, this fact does not impact a court’s Rule 17 
obligation.  Rule 17 protects the interests of incompetent 
persons.  Thus, when a person is deemed incompetent, the case 
pauses until steps are taken to protect his interests, and “a court 






For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the dismissal 
order and remand for further proceedings.   
 
1915(e)(2) screening if applicable” until his competency is 
addressed.  Powell, 680 F.3d at 307. 
